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Abstract
This study analyzes how nancial shocks in one country transmit to another country
through international trade. To this end, it develops a dynamic general equilibrium model
of two-country Ricardian trade with a continuum of goods. Financial frictions exist in each
country and the two countries can be asymmetric in terms of the degree of frictions, which
can be a novel source of comparative advantage. In the case of a permanent credit crunch,
we can analytically show that such a shock reduces the long-run investment, GDP, wage
income, and aggregate income of heterogeneous entrepreneurs in both countries. We also
numerically investigate the transitory responses to a temporal credit shock and show that
such an internationally synchronized economic downturn is also observed during transition
periods.
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1 Introduction
The recent globally synchronized economic downturn during the nancial crisis of 2007{2009
drew more attention toward the importance of interdependence among countries. How does
a domestic business cycle shock in one country aect other countries? Recent theoretical
studies emphasize the critical role of frictions in domestic nancial markets for transmitting a
shock from one country to another. Examples of such contributions using dynamic two-country
models include Devereux and Yetman (2010), Devereux and Sutherland (2011), Kollmann et al.
(2011), and Perri and Quadrini (2017). As explained below, their common nding is that under
a higher level of nancial integration, a country-specic shock leads to a more synchronized
decline in economic activities.
All these studies assume a single consumption/investment good economy, thereby ignoring
the possible transmission channel through the intra-temporal trade of multiple goods. While
there is little doubt that nancial globalization played an important role in the international
co-movement seen during the recent nancial crisis, the fact remains that not only international
nancial transactions, but also international trade in goods is the engine of globalization. On
that basis, a nancial shock in one country is also likely to spread through the latter channel
of globalization. For instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) nd that openness to trade
had signicant eects on the severity of aected countries' recessions. Moreover, by employing
rm-level micro data for 42 countries, Claessens et al. (2012) nd that the 2007{2009 crisis
had a larger negative impact on rms in countries more open to trade. These results suggest
that international trade may also have contributed to the global recession in a non-trivial way.
Against this background, this study theoretically explores how nancial shocks in one
country propagate to its partner country through international trade in goods alone. For
this purpose, it incorporates nancial frictions and international trade into a two-country dy-
namic general equilibrium framework. To simply embed nancial frictions, this study borrows
the heterogeneous agent framework of Buera and Moll (2015), who examine how a nancial
shock, modeled as a tightening of borrowing constraints, aects aggregate eciency in a closed
economy.1 In our model, each country consists of homogeneous workers and heterogeneous
entrepreneurs who engage in investment projects to produce capital. Heterogeneity arises in
their investment technologies by receiving idiosyncratic shocks. In addition, they can borrow
1Since the seminal works by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), macroeconomic
models with nancial frictions have been major workhorses in business cycle studies. For instance, recent
studies such as Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Buera and Moll (2015) have focused on the shocks on the
credit constraint itself as a key inuence on business cycles.
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from domestic lenders only up to a proportion of their own funds (i.e., they are credit con-
strained). These two assumptions jointly generate a cuto that classies the entrepreneurs into
those actively investing and those inactively investing.
In addition, to describe the international production reallocation induced by nancial
shocks, this study extends the Ricardian trade model with a continuum of goods developed
by Dornbusch et al. (1977) to the framework of endogenous capital accumulation.2 In the
present model, the two countries trade a continuum of intermediate goods used for the domes-
tic production of a single nal good. This nal good is used for domestic consumption and
investment. The advantage of employing such a continuum-good Ricardian framework is that
it allows us to explore how each country experiences changes in its extensive margins of exports
and imports. This, in turn, enables us to simply examine how nancial shocks in one country
aect the major macroeconomic variables in its partner country through international trade.
Within this framework, the present study analyzes the impacts of two kinds of nancial
shocks, namely a permanent and a temporal tightening of borrowing constraints (i.e., a credit
crunch) in one country. Considering the former case is helpful to understand the qualitative
characteristics of the model. In this case, we can analytically obtain the following two results.
First, a credit crunch in one country changes the trade patterns in the long-run equilibrium
such that this country experiences a decrease in its extensive margin of exports. Second,
such a credit crunch reduces the investment, GDP, wage income, and aggregate income of
the entrepreneurs in both countries. That is, international trade can work as the driver of a
synchronized economic downturn.
The mechanism is explained as follows. Suppose that the borrowing constraint tightens
in one country. This induces an inecient reallocation of nancial resources in that country
from relatively high productive entrepreneurs to less productive ones who are otherwise inactive
investors. From such a misallocation, investment eciency declines on average, thereby making
capital in this country endogenously scarce relative to labor. This means that the credit crunch
aects the labor productivity of each sector in this country. Thus, in this model, the degree
of nancial frictions is a key determinant of the comparative advantage in the steady-state
equilibrium.
At the same time, this naturally raises the domestic price of capital in the country that
experiences the credit crunch, which is, in turn, reected by an increase in the price of the
intermediate goods produced in that country. Since they are exported, not only the country,
but also its partner country faces upward pressure on the price of the domestic nal good. Then,
2See Eaton and Kortum (2012) for reviews of recent developments in Ricardian trade theory.
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to oset this upward pressure, the wage rate must fall in the partner country. Consequently,
motivated by their cost-minimizing motive, the nal good producers in the partner country
reduce demand for capital. Consequently, investment in the partner country also decreases.
These two analytical results are obtained without specifying the distribution function for the
heterogeneity of entrepreneurs or assuming symmetry across the two countries.
Next, we turn to the more realistic case of a temporal credit shock. Under simply calibrated
parameter values, our numerical experiment shows that these two results are also observed
during transition periods. In addition, it is found that the degree of international co-movement
increases as the intermediate goods become more complementary. This result is consistent
with Heathcote and Perri's (2002) nding in a two-country international RBC model that the
degree of international co-movement is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution between the
tradable intermediate goods. Thus, this study obtains the following new theoretical nding
that a credit shock in a country can be not only a source of business cycles in that country, but
also combined with international trade to have a key inuence on international co-movement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After Section 1.1 discusses the related lit-
erature, Section 2 describes the setup of the model. Section 3 shows the uniqueness and local
stability of the steady-state equilibrium. Section 4 pursues the qualitative characteristics of the
model by considering a permanent credit crunch in one country. Section 5 calibrates the pa-
rameter values in this model and conducts a simple numerical analysis about a temporal credit
shock to obtain the transitory responses of major macroeconomic variables in two countries.
Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
The results of this study complement the growing literature on the international transmission of
domestic shocks under nancial frictions. As introduced in the previous section, Devereux and
Yetman (2010) construct a two-country model abstracting capital accumulation and consider
the international transmission of a productivity shock in one country. They numerically exam-
ine how such a transmission is aected by the binding of borrowing constraints for investors
who invest in domestic and foreign productive assets internationally. Devereux and Sutherland
(2011) use Devereux and Yetman's framework to examine the eects of a credit crunch in one
country. They investigate the transmission mechanisms in two nancial integration settings,
namely integration in a bond market and integration in both bond and equity markets, and
show that integration in the equity market is crucial for generating international co-movement.3
3They also extend Devereux and Yetman's (2010) model to allow for capital accumulation.
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Kollmann et al. (2011) assume a representative global bank that collects deposits from house-
holds in both countries and makes loans to entrepreneurs. They then quantitatively examine
how the increase in the loan default rate in one country contributes to business cycle uc-
tuations in both countries. More recently, Perri and Quadrini (2017) develop a two-country
model within which the rms in each country face a borrowing constraint: whether such a
constraint is binding depends on agents' self-fullling expectations. Therefore, a credit crunch
endogenously occurs in their model.
In contrast to the aforementioned work that investigates the transmission mechanisms in
various nancial integration settings, this study focuses on nancial frictions as a determinant
of the comparative advantage. Given that both international trade and international nancial
transactions serve as engines of globalization in reality, the results of this study can complement
the theoretical ndings in the literature. Recently, within the framework of a symmetric two-
country DSGE model, Imura and Thomas (2016) conduct a quantitative analysis of how a
temporal credit crunch in one country propagates to the partner country through trade in two
kinds of intermediate goods. By doing so, they retain the assumption of international symmetry
and assume that trade patterns are exogenous by employing the Armington assumption.
This study also contributes to the literature on international trade and nancial frictions.
Among previous empirical studies, Beck (2002, 2003) suggests that countries with better devel-
oped systems in their domestic nancial markets have higher export shares in industries that
use more external nance. He also reports evidence that such countries have a higher export
share in GDP. On the theoretical side, the role of nancial frictions in the equilibrium patterns
of trade is examined in some studies. Examples of such studies include Matsuyama (2005),
Antras and Caballero (2009), and Ju and Wei (2011). The role of nancial frictions in this
model is signicantly dierent from their static trade models. In the dynamic model where
the steady-state level of capital is endogenously determined, capital is no longer an exogenous
endowment, but rather it changes over time and indirectly inuences labor productivity in
each sector. That is, in such a dynamic economy, trade patterns are determined in a Ricardian
manner rather than under a Heckscher{Ohlin model irrespective of the number of production
factors.4 Our model thus highlights the role of nancial frictions in capital accumulation.
4Baxter (1992) was the rst to point out this Ricardian property by using a dynamic two-country, two-good,
two-factor model. She shows that international heterogeneity in capital income tax rates leads at least one
country to perfectly specialize in one good. By contrast, Chen (1992) retains the assumption that preferences,
the production technology of each good, and public policies are identical between the countries, showing that if
this is the case, the Heckscher{Ohlin theorem holds even in a dynamic framework.
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2 Model
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; : : : The world consists of two countries, namely
home (denoted by H) and foreign (F ), hereafter indexed by j 2 fH;Fg. In each country, a
single non-tradable nal good can be used for domestic consumption and investment. The nal
good is produced from a continuum of tradable intermediate goods with unit measure. Each
variety of intermediate goods is produced from non-tradable capital and labor. Since we focus
on exploring how credit shocks in one country are transmitted to the other country through
international trade in goods alone, we do not consider international nancial transactions.5
In each country j, there are two types of innitely lived agents: one is a continuum of
heterogeneous entrepreneurs with unit measure and the other is that of homogeneous workers
with measure Lj > 0. The entrepreneurs accumulate capital and rent it to the domestic
intermediate good rms. In each period, they face an idiosyncratic productivity shock on
their investment technologies, and only highly productive entrepreneurs produce capital by
their investment, as shown in Section 2.2. Although each entrepreneur faces such a stochastic
environment, there is no aggregate uncertainty.
The two countries can be asymmetric in terms of residents' discount factor, the degree of
nancial frictions, and the distribution of entrepreneurs' heterogeneity.
2.1 Production of Goods
The representative nal good rm in country j combines a continuum of intermediate goods
to produce the nal good according to the following CES production function:
Yj;t =
Z 1
0
xj;t(!)
 1
 d!
 
 1
;
where Yj;t is the output of the nal good, xj;t(!) is demand for the intermediate good of variety
! 2 [0; 1], and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties.
All varieties of the intermediate goods are freely traded and thus there is no international
price gap. Let pt(!) stand for the price of variety ! and Pj;t denote the price of the nal good.
Under perfect competition, the nal good rm in country j chooses (xj;t(!))!2[0;1] to maximize
5Heathcote and Perri (2002) show that models without international nancial transactions can generate
international synchronization more closely tted to the data than models with nancial integration. Inspired
by their nding, such a \nancial autarky" assumption is often employed in studies that focus on international
trade as a potential source of international co-movement. See, for instance, Kose and Yi (2006) and Arkolakis
and Ramanarayanan (2009).
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its prot Pj;tYj;t  
R 1
0 pt(!)xj;t(!)d! subject to its production function. Prot maximization
implies that
xj;t(!) =

pt(!)
Pj;t
 
Yj;t 8! 2 [0; 1];
Pj;t =
Z 1
0
pt(!)
1 d!
 1
1 
8j 2 fH;Fg;
where the right-hand side of the second equation represents the price index of the intermediate
goods. Throughout the paper, the nal good in one country is chosen as the numeraire. As
the above equation shows, the free trade in the intermediate goods means that the price in the
other country also becomes unity: Pj;t = 1 for all j.
Turn to the intermediate good sector. Let Xj;t(!) denote the output of variety ! in country
j. Each intermediate good is produced according to the following Cobb{Douglas technology:
Xj;t(!) =
1
 j(!)

Kj;t(!)

Lj;t(!)
1  
1 
;
where Kj;t(!) and Lj;t(!) are demand for capital and labor, respectively.  j(!) > 0 captures
the exogenous and country-specic productivity parameter for variety !. Thanks to the speci-
cation such that the share of capital  2 (0; 1) does not vary across varieties, the specialization
pattern in equilibrium is determined in the same way as Dornbusch et al. (1977), the detail of
which is explained in Section 3.
Let qj;t and wj;t denote the rental price of capital and wage rate in country j, respectively.
The unit cost function in country j is given by
mcj;t(!) = min
eK ;eL
n
qj;teK + wj;teL
 1 = ( j(!)) 1 (eK=) (eL=(1  ))1 o
=  j(!)q

j;tw
1 
j;t :
Perfect competition results in pt(!) = minjfmcj;t(!)g.
Following Dornbusch et al. (1977), the varieties are indexed so that
d( F (!)= H(!))
d!
< 0:
In other words, all other things being equal, the home (foreign) country has a comparative
advantage in low-indexed (high-indexed) goods. Let !ct denote the cuto variety of the extensive
margin of exports in each country. Under the assumed technology distribution, any variety
no more (less) than !ct is produced in the home (foreign) country. The cuto is implicitly
determined from mcH;t(!) = mcF;t(!), which is rewritten as
 F (!
c
t )
 H(!ct )


qH;t
qF;t
wH;t
wF;t
1 
:
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In Section 3, it is shown that !ct is interior of [0; 1]. Let 
H;t  [0; !ct ] and 
F;t  [!ct ; 1] stand
for the sets of the varieties produced in the home and foreign countries, respectively. The price
of each variety is given by
pt(!) =
8><>: H(!)q

H;tw
1 
H;t for ! 2 
H;t;
 F (!)q

F;tw
1 
F;t for ! 2 
F;t;
: (1)
The price index of the intermediate goods accordingly satises
1 =
"
qH;tw
1 
H;t
1  Z

H;t
 H(!)
1 d! +

qF;tw
1 
F;t
1  Z

F;t
 F (!)
1 d!
#1=(1 )
: (2)
Throughout the paper, it is ensured that
Assumption 1.
R
!2
j;t  j(!)
1 d! > 0. for all j 2 fH;Fg.
For example, when  j(!) is specied as  j(!) = !
 j with the restriction  (F  H) < 0,
the above assumption is satised as long as 1  j(1  ) > 0 is satised.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
In country j, there exists a unit measure of entrepreneurs, indexed by ij 2 [0; 1]. The preferences
of agent ij are given by the following utility function:
EU ij;t = Et
" 1X
=t
(j)
 t log cij;
#
;
where cij is consumption and j 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, which can vary across countries,
but is the same among the entrepreneurs within a country.
For simplicity, capital fully depreciates in one period. The investment technology of agent
ij in period t is
kij;t+1 = 
i
j;tz
i
j;t;
where zij;t and k
i
j;t+1 are investment and capital, respectively.
6 Entrepreneurs dier in the
eciency of investment technologies, denoted by ij;t 2 [; ]. Throughout the paper, ij;t
6The results are qualitatively the same even when capital depreciates only partially as long as the remaining
capital is liquidated before the new investment. If this is the case, the investment technology equation remains
the same, whereas the budget constraint is replaced by (qj;t+1 j)kij;t (1+rj;t)dij;t 1+dij;t = cij;t+zij;t, where
j 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate. By doing so, the autonomous dynamic system given in Section 3 becomes
slightly more complex. However, the unique existence of the steady-state equilibrium is shown in the same way
as the model of perfect depreciation. Furthermore, the comparative statics of the steady state are qualitatively
the same and hence the main results presented in this paper, summarized in Propositions 1{3, are also obtained
in this case. See the separate appendix of the paper (not intended for publication).
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is continuous and its upper limit  is suciently large. At the end of each period, each en-
trepreneur draws a new productivity from the time-invariant distribution, which is captured by
Gj()  Prob

ij;t   j j

and the corresponding density function gj() = dGj()=d. Thus,
ij;t is independent and identically distributed not only across agents but also over periods. The
shape of the distribution can be country-specic.
The budget constraint is
qj;tk
i
j;t   (1 + rj;t)dij;t 1 + dij;t = cij;t + zij;t;
where rj;t is the interest rate and d
i
j;t is the end-of-period stock of the one-period bonds issued
by entrepreneur ij (i.e., his/her debt). In this model, each entrepreneur faces the following
credit constraint:
dij;t  j;tzij;t;
where j;t 2 [0; 1]. Such a formulation is analytically convenient to capture credit market
imperfections. It states that at most a proportion j;t of investment can be externally nanced.
By varying j;t, we can trace out all degrees of nancial frictions: j;t = 1 corresponds to a
perfect credit market and j;t = 0 to the case where there is no nancial market.
Let us introduce the following new variables:
mij;t  qj;tkij;t   (1 + rj;t)dij;t 1;
aij;t  zij;t   dij;t;
j;t  j;t=(1  j;t) 2 [0;1):
In short, mij;t is an entrepreneur's net income ow and a
i
j;t is his/her own funds (or cash-on-
hand) for capital investment. By using these variables, the budget and credit constraints are
respectively simplied to mij;t = c
i
j;t+a
i
j;t and d
i
j;t  j;taij;t, the latter of which is equivalent to
zij;t  (1 + j;t)aij;t:
Namely, j;t captures the leverage ratio.
We are now ready to describe the optimization problem of an entrepreneur. Following
Buera and Moll (2015), we assume that each entrepreneur can decide zij;t and d
i
j;t after ob-
serving his/her investment eciency ij;t. Thus, both m
i
j;t and 
i
j;t are state variables in period
t. This means that the optimization problem contains both static and dynamic maximization
problems, solved stage by stage. In the rst stage, each entrepreneur decides his/her consump-
tion and cash-on-hand, motivated by the intertemporal consumption smoothing. This problem
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is recursively described as the following Bellman equation:
Vj;t(m; ) = max
a
(
log(m  a) + j
Z 

Vj;t+1(mj;t+1(a; ); 
0)dGj(0)
)
; (3)
where Vj;t(m; ) is the value function in period t and mj;t+1(a; ) is the maximized net income
ow in the next period, dened as the solution to the following second-stage static optimization
problem:
mj;t+1(a; ) = max
z
n
qj;t+1z   (1 + rj;t+1)(z   a) j 0  z  (1 + j;t)a
o
: (4)
In other words, in the second stage, the entrepreneur decides his/her investment by taking
his/her own funds in period t as given.
We can solve these problems in a backward manner from the second stage. By solving
problem (4), the optimal investment and borrowing are given by
(zj;t(a; ); dj;t(a; )) =
8><>:(0;  a) if  < 
c
j;t
((1 + j;t)a;  j;ta) if   cj;t;
(5)
where cj;t is the cuto eciency of investment, dened as
cj;t =
1 + rj;t+1
qj;t+1
:
(5) suggests that the credit constraint is necessarily binding when an entrepreneur is actively
investing. When he/she is not, he/she lends all nancial funds to other active entrepreneurs.
From (4) and (5), the maximized net income ow is given by
mj;t+1(a; ) = Rj;t+1()a;
Rj;t+1() 
8><>:1 + rj;t+1 if  < 
c
j;t
(1 + j;t)qj;t+1   j;t(1 + rj;t+1) if   cj;t:
Now, we turn to the intertemporal optimization problem. The rst-order condition of problem
(3) is
1
m  a = jEt

@mj;t+1(a; )
@a
@Vj;t+1(m
0; 0)
@m0

:
Since there is no aggregate uncertainty,
@mj;t+1(a;)
@a = Rj;t+1() is not stochastic. Then,
1
m  a = jRj;t+1()Et

@Vj;t+1(m
0; 0)
@m0

: (6)
Appendix A shows that a is given by a = jm.
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Let Aj;t =
R 1
0 a
i
j;tdi. Hereafter, we refer to Aj;t as the \aggregate wealth" in country j,
since an entrepreneur's cash-on-hand aij;t is at the same time his/her net worth at the end of
a period. Since net income mij;t has already been determined when the value of 
i
j;t is realized,
aij;t(= jm
i
j;t) is independent of 
i
j;t. Therefore, Aj;t is expressed as
R
adFj;t(a), where Fj;t is
the resulting distribution of aij;t. Furthermore, since  is iid across agents, no information on
Fj;t is required to obtain the aggregate values. (5) provides the aggregate investment Zj;t as
Zj;t 
Z Z 

zj;t(a; )dGj()dFj;t(a)
= (1 + j;t)Aj;t(1 Gj(cj;t)):
Accordingly, the resulting amount of aggregate capital Kj;t+1 is given by j(
c
j;t)Zj;t, where
j() is a tail-conditional average of :
j(
c
j;t)  (1 Gj(cj;t)) 1
Z 
cj;t
dGj():
This captures the average productivity of the aggregate investment. It is easily shown that
dj(
c
j;t)=d
c
j;t > 0. Finally, the aggregate wealth in the next period Aj;t+1 is given by
Aj;t+1  j
Z Z 

mj;t+1(a; )dGj()dFj;t(a)
= j
h
qj;t+1Kj;t+1 + (1 + rj;t+1)Bj;t
i
; (7)
where
Bj;t  Aj;t   Zj;t = [1  (1 + j;t)(1 Gj(cj;t))]Aj;t:
That is, Bj;t is the domestic excess supply of nancial funds. In other words,  Bj;t is the net
supply of the one-period bonds issued by the entrepreneurs. The aggregate consumption of
entrepreneurs, denoted by CEj;t, is obtained as (1  j)Aj;t=j .
2.3 Workers
Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor and he/she inelastically supplies it in each
period to earn the wage rate, wj;t. Following Buera and Moll (2015), the workers do not have
investment opportunities or cannot borrow/save (i.e., they are hand-to-mouth consumers):
CWj;t = wj;tLj ;
where CWj;t is the aggregate consumption of workers in country j.
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2.4 Market-clearing Conditions
The model is closed by the market-clearing conditions. These conditions for capital and labor
in country j are respectively given by
Kj;t =
Z

j;t
Kj;t(!)d!; (8)
Lj =
Z

j;t
Lj;t(!)d!: (9)
The market-clearing condition of the intermediate goods is given by Xj;t(!) = xH;t(!)+xF;t(!)
for all ! 2 
j;t. In other words,
xH;t(!) + xF;t(!) =
8><>:XH;t(!) for ! 2 
H;t;XF;t(!) for ! 2 
F;t: (10)
Without international nancial transactions, the bonds are in zero net supply:
Bj;t = 0: (11)
Finally, the market-clearing condition for the nal good in each country is
Yj;t = C
E
j;t + C
W
j;t + Zj;t: (12)
From (8){(12) with the rms' zero prot conditions and aggregate budget constraint,7 the fol-
lowing trade balance automatically implies fromWalras' law:
R 1
!ct
pt(!)xH;t(!)d! =
R !ct
0 pt(!)xF;t(!)d!:
3 Analytical Characterization of the Equilibrium
In this section, we analytically characterize the equilibrium. The market-clearing condition of
the bonds (11) shows that Zj;t = Aj;t. From the denition of Zj;t, this is rewritten as
1 = (1 + j;t)(1 Gj(cj;t)): (13)
Given j;t, (13) has the unique interior solution for 
c
j;t. This is hereafter denoted by 
c
j(j;t):
dcj(j;t)
dj;t
=
1 Gj()
(1 + j;t)gj() > 0:
Since Zj;t = Aj;t, the level of capital in the next period is Kj;t+1 =  j(j)Aj;t, where  j(j;t) 
j(
c
j(j;t)) is the average productivity of the aggregate investment in equilibrium:
d j(j;t)
dj;t
= (1 Gj())
 
j(
c
j) cj

> 0:
7The aggregate budget constraint in country j is given by Aj;t = qj;tKj;t+(1+rj;t)Bj;t 1+wj;tLj CEj;t CWj;t .
12
The dynamic equation of the aggregate wealth is therefore given by Aj;t+1 = jqj+1 j(j;t)Aj;t.
We next dene the following new variables:
eAt  AH;t=AF;t; eqt  qH;t=qF;t; ewt  wH;t=wF;t:
We refer to eAt as relative wealth in the home country to that in the foreign country and (eqt; ewt)
as the factoral terms of trade in the home country. Appendix B shows that the autonomous
system of equilibrium dynamics is given by
eAt+1 = H H(H;t)
F F (F;t)
eqt+1 eAt; (14)
ewt+1 = 1(!ct+1; eqt+1)  eq =(1 )t+1  F (!ct+1) H(!ct+1)
1=(1 )
; (15)
ewt+1 = 2(!ct+1; eqt+1) 
0@eq(1 )t+1 LFLH
R !ct+1
0  H(!)
1 d!R 1
!ct+1
 F (!)
1 d!
1A 11+(1 )( 1) ; (16)
eAt+1 =  F (F;t)
 H(H;t)
ewt+1eqt+1 LHLF : (17)
This system consists of the dynamic equation (14) and the static system of equations (15){(17).
(14) is the dynamic equation of relative wealth. This equation shows that given the endogenous
variables eAt and eqt+1, relative wealth in the next period depends on the following three kinds
of international asymmetries: (i) asymmetry in the entrepreneurs' discount factor (j); (ii)
asymmetry in the degree of nancial frictions (j;t); and (iii) asymmetry in the distribution of
 (Gj()).
Given eAt, the static system (15){(17) determines the factoral terms of trade (eqt+1; ewt+1)
and the cuto variety !ct+1. (15) is the equation that denes !
c
t+1, and (16) is obtained from
the labor market equilibrium in both countries. In this model, the capital market equilibrium
in each country is given by Kj;t+1 = wj;t+1Lj=[(1  )qj;t+1]. (17) is then obtained from this
condition considering thatKj;t+1 is given byKj;t+1 =  j(j;t)Aj;t. As in a standard continuum-
good Ricardian model, (15) and (16) determine the relative wage and cuto variety.8
Lemma 1. Given eqt+1 > 0, there uniquely exists the pair ( ewt+1; !ct+1), which solves (15) and
(16), where !ct+1 is in the interior of [0; 1].
Proof. Note that 1 is a decreasing function of !
c. By contrast, since 1 + (1  )(   1) > 0,
2 is an increasing function of !
c with 2(0; q) = 0 and 2(1; q) =1. This implies that there
uniquely exists !ct+1 2 (0; 1) that solves 1(!ct+1; eqt+1) = 2(!ct+1; eqt+1).
8Thus, these two equations play the same role as the corresponding equations in Dornbusch et al. (1977).
To see why, consider the special case of ! 0 and  ! 1. If this is the case, (15) and (16) respectively becomeewt+1 =  F (!ct+1)= H(!ct+1) and ewt+1 = !ct+1LF =[(1  !ct+1)LH ], which appear in Dornbusch et al. (1977).
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Figure 1: Patterns of Trade in the Steady-State Equilibrium
This lemma ensures that ewt+1 and !ct+1 are given by the functions of eqt+1. From this
result and (17), eqt+1 is given by the function of eAt. Substituting this result into (14) yields
the autonomous dynamic equation of eAt+1. In the initial period, the net income ow of each
agent, mij;0 is historically given. Since a
i
j;0 = jm
i
j;0, its aggregate value Aj;0 is also shown to
be historically given. Thus, given the initial condition eA0( AH;0=AF;0) and the exogenous
sequences of fj;tg, (14){(17) jointly constitute the autonomous dynamic system of the model.
Consider the steady-state equilibrium where j;t is given by an exogenous constant:
j;t = j > 0:
From (14) with eAt+1 = eAt, the steady-state value of eqt is readily given by eq = F F (F )H H(H) ,
where a superscript asterisk represents the steady-state equilibrium. Lemma 1 ensures that
(15) and (16) provide ew and !c. The steady state of relative wealth, eA, is then uniquely
determined from (17). Accordingly, all the other variables can be determined by substituting
( eA; eq; ew; !c) back into the appropriate equations. For instance, the steady-state value of
the wage rate in the foreign country wF is determined from the following equation that comes
from (2):
1 = qF
wF
1 
" eq ew1 1  Z !c
0
 H(!)
1 d! +
Z 1
!c
 F (!)
1 d!
#1=(1 )
; (18)
where qj = 1=(j j(j)).
Figure 1 depicts how ew and !c are determined in the steady-state equilibrium, which
thus graphically shows the range of exporting varieties in each country. (15) is depicted as a
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downward sloping curve since a higher ewt+1 raises the marginal cost of the intermediate good
rms in the home country relative to those in the foreign country. This results in the decrease
in the varieties exported in this country. By contrast, since  > 1 is assumed, (16) is depicted
as an upward sloping curve. It is upward sloping since a higher !ct+1 implies that more varieties
are produced in the home country and this increases demand for labor in this country. Thus,
the wage rate in the home country relative to that in the foreign country goes up. Note that a
similar gure is used to characterize the equilibrium patterns of trade in static continuum-good
Ricardian models such as Dornbusch et al. (1977).
However, there is an important dierence between our model and static models in the
following respect that in our model the location of each curve is aected by capital prices
qj . This means that the international dierence in capital prices can aect the patterns of
trade in intermediate goods. Moreover, such a dierence is generated from the aforementioned
international asymmetries. If there is no international asymmetry, in other words, if H = F ,
H = F , and GH() = GF (), then qH = qF (i.e., eq = 1) holds and the patterns of trade
eventually depend solely on the technological factors. By contrast, if there are international
asymmetries in some respects, eq can deviate from unity and hence such asymmetries can
inuence the patterns of trade in the steady-state equilibrium. Thus, each asymmetry can
work as a source of comparative advantage. In the next section, we therefore pursue how the
tightening of credit constraints in one country aects the equilibrium patterns of trade.
We now turn to the stability of the steady state. In Appendix C, a log-linear approximation
of the system (14){(17) is given, and it is shown that the steady state eA is locally stable as
long as the exogenous sequence fj;tg monotonically converges to j .
Lemma 2. The steady state of the economy is unique and locally stable.
Proof. See Appendix C.
4 Qualitative Nature of the Steady-State Equilibrium
In this section, to understand the qualitative nature of the steady-state equilibrium, we examine
how a permanent credit crunch (i.e., the tightening of credit constraints) in one country (i.e.,
dj < 0, dn = 0) aects it and its partner countries in the long run.
As shown in the previous section, the cuto productivity of investment in country j, cj(j),
depends only on the degree of domestic nancial frictions and shape of the distribution in this
country. Since the capital price at the steady state is qj = 1=(j j(j)), it immediately follows
that dqj =q

j =  jdj=j , where j  j 0j(j)= j(j) > 0. Thus, in the long run, a credit
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crunch in one country raises the capital price only in that country. The intuition is explained
as follows. A credit crunch decreases the borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs, which induces
the entry of less productive entrepreneurs who otherwise become inactive investors. Such an
inecient reallocation of nancial resources lowers the average productivity of the aggregate
investment. Consequently, the supply of capital decreases and its price rises.
From (15) and (16), we obtain
d!c
!c
=   

deqeq ; (19)
d ewew =  [(   1) + "] deqeq ; (20)
where deq=eq    (HdH=H   FdF =F ). In these equations, , " and  are dened in
Appendix C as
  !
c 0H(!
c)
 H(!c)
  !
c 0F (!
c)
 F (!c)
> 0;
"  "H + "F > 0; "j 
!c j(!c)1 R

j
 j(!)
1 d!
> 0;
  [1 + (   1)(1  )] + (1  )" > 0:
Since deq=eq is positive (negative) when the credit crunch occurs in the home (foreign) country,
(19) and (20) show the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider the steady-state equilibrium. A permanent credit crunch in one
country triggers
1. A decrease (increase) in the extensive margin of exports in its (the partner) country; and
2. A decrease in its wage relative to the partner country.
This proposition, especially its rst claim, has the following two clear-cut implications.
First, a change in the degree of nancial frictions alters the comparative advantage in the
steady-state equilibrium. In this dynamic model, capital is no longer an exogenous endow-
ment, but rather it changes over time. Thus, the steady-state level of capital is endogenously
determined and this level inuences labor productivity. As shown above, the capital price in-
creases in the country that directly experiences a credit crunch. This fact implies that labor
supply in this country becomes relatively abandoned, the marginal productivity of which then
declines.
Second, this proposition suggests that following a credit crunch in one country, its eects can
propagate to the partner country through international trade. First, the following proposition
shows that wages fall in both countries from a unilateral credit crunch.
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Proposition 2. Consider the steady-state equilibrium. A permanent credit crunch in one
country decreases the wages in both countries.
Proof. See Appendix D.
In the process of the proof, we can obtain the following formula, showing the decomposition
of the eect on the wage in each country:9
dwH
wH
=
1
1  

H
dH
H
  H
d!c
!c

;
dwF
wF
=
1
1  

F
dF
F
+ F
d!c
!c

;
where j 2 (0; 1) is the long-run import share of the nal good rms in country j: j 
(qn w1 n )1 
R

n
 n(!)
1 d! 2 (0; 1), where j; n( 6= j) 2 fH;Fg:10 In each equation, the
rst term in the brackets represents the direct eect of a credit crunch and the second term
captures the eect induced by the trade in intermediate goods. Note that while the former
eect appears only in the country that directly experiences the credit crunch, the latter eect
always exists in both countries, and from Proposition 1 it can be positive or negative depending
on the location of the triggering event. For instance, suppose that a credit crunch occurs in
the home country, i.e., dH < 0 and dF = 0. If this is the case, dq

H=q

H > 0, dq

F =q

F = 0, and
d!c=!c < 0. From the above formula, we can easily verify dwF =w

F < 0. By contrast, in the
home country, the indirect eect is competing with the direct eect. Appendix D shows that
the direct eect always dominates. Note that despite such a competing eect, the wage rate in
the home country declines more sharply since in this case d ew= ew < 0 from the second claim
of Proposition 1.
Such an internationally synchronized change in wages in turn plays an important role in
the synchronization of the other macroeconomic variables. The amount of capital at the steady
state is given by Kj = w

jLj=[(1 )qj ]. From Proposition 2, wj=qj drops in both countries.
This nding implies that the long-run level of capital decreases in both countries. Furthermore,
Proposition 2 derives the following results.
Proposition 3. Consider the steady-state equilibrium. A permanent credit crunch in one
country decreases the long-run levels of aggregate investment, entrepreneurs' income, and GDP
in both countries.
9Indeed, these equations correspond to (33) and (34) in Appendix D.
10j;t is primarily dened as j;t 
R

n;t
pt(!)xj;t(!)d!=Yj;t. From xj;t(!) = pt(!)
 Yj;t and the fact that
pt(!) =  n(!)q

n;tw
1 
n;t for all ! 2 
n;t, we obtain j;t =
 
qn;tw
1 
n;t
1  R

n;t
 n(!)
1 d!. From (2), we can
verify that
P
j j;t = 1.
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Proof. Recall that Zj = A

j . Since Kj;t+1 is given by  j(j)Aj;t, A

j = K

j = j(j) holds in the
steady-state equilibrium. Then, the rate of change in aggregate investment is
dZj
Zj
=
dKj
Kj
  j dj
j
=
dwj
wj
;
where we use dqj =q

j =  jdj=j . From Proposition 2, the above equation implies that ag-
gregate investment decreases in both countries. Since the aggregate income of entrepreneurs is
given by qjK

j = w

jLj=(1 ), we can easily verify that the aggregate income of entrepreneurs
decreases in both countries.11
Finally, long-run GDP is given by
R

j
pt(!)Xj;t(!)d!. From the zero-prot conditions of
the intermediate good rms and market-clearing conditions (8) and (9), this is reduced to
wjLj=(1  ).
All the results in this section are obtained without relying on the specication of the dis-
tribution function or assuming symmetry across the two countries.
Finally, to understand the qualitative nature of the equilibrium more in depth, it is helpful
to examine what happens if the trade patterns are exogenously given. If this is the case, (15)
disappears and the relative wage at the steady state is determined solely from (16) with eq and
!c given. Then, the equation for its rate of change (20) is replaced by
d ewew d!c=0 =  (   1)1 + (   1)(1  ) deqeq ;
where deq=eq    (HdH=H   FdF =F ) is the same as before. The steady-state wage in
the foreign country is determined from (18). The logarithmic dierentiation of this equation
under the hypothetical situation that d!c = 0 yields
dwF
wF

d!c=0
=   1
1  


dqF
qF
+ F


deqeq + (1  )d ewew d!c=0

=   1
1  


dqF
qF
+ F

1 + (   1)(1  )
deqeq

:
Consider the situation that the credit crunch occurs in the home country: dH < 0 and
dF = 0. Then, the above equation shows
dwF
wF

d!c=0
=   

F
1  
H
1 + (   1)(1  )
dH
H
:
11From the aggregate income, qjK

j  (1+rj )j [1 Gj(cj(j))]Aj is distributed to agents who invest, whereas
(1 + rj )Gj((
c
j(j)))A

j is distributed to agents who lend, where r

j  qjcj(j)  1.
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By using (19), the rate of actual change for wF in this model is given by
dwF
wF

d!c=0
=   

F
1  
H

dH
H
:
Lemma 3. The degree of the reduction in the wage rate induced by the international transmis-
sion is smaller when trade patterns are endogenously determined.
Proof. From the denition of  in Appendix C,   [1 + (   1)(1  )] + (1  )". This
is strictly larger than [1 + (   1)(1  )] because  2 (0; 1) and " > 0. Then,


<
1
1 + (   1)(1  ) ;
which implies that the absolute value of dwF =w

F jd!c=0 is strictly larger than that of dwF =wF .
This lemma shows that the change in trade patterns itself acts as a buer against the
international transmission of shocks. To grasp its intuition, suppose that a credit crunch
occurs in the home country. As already explained, this distorts the nancial resources among
domestic entrepreneurs and pushes up the capital price in that country. As (18) shows, this
places upward pressure on the price index of the intermediate goods. Since the price of the nal
good is xed here, such pressure must be oset. Then, the wage in the foreign country eventually
declines. When trade patterns are endogenously determined, however, the rise in the capital
price simultaneously changes the equilibrium trade patterns. The rms in the home country
with a smaller comparative advantage are replaced by foreign ones. Consequently, the upward
pressure on the price index is mitigated by such an international production reallocation.
4.1 Welfare Implications
At this point, we briey discuss the implications for entrepreneurs' expected utilities in each
country. For analytical convenience, suppose that the economy has arrived at its steady-state
equilibrium in period t.
Pick an entrepreneur in country j whose net income is given bymt. His/her expected utility
before drawing  in that period is given by
EV SSj (j jmt) =
Z 

V j (mt; )dGj();
where V j (m; ) is the value function dened by the Bellman equation (3), with the market
variables qj;t+1 and rj;t+1 now given by their steady-state values. Recall that Vj;t is the value
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function evaluated after drawing  in period t. Therefore, we have to calculate its expected
value to obtain the ex-ante value function. As we show in Appendix E, EV SSj is given by
EV SSj (j jmt) =
1
1  j
(
j
1  j
Z 

log

Rj ()

dGj() + logmt +
j
1  j log j + log(1  j)
)
;
where
Rj () 
8><>:q

j (1 + j)  (1 + rj )j if   cj(j);
1 + rj if  < 
c
j(j):
Recall that qj or r

j (= q

j
c
j   1) never depends on n (n 6= j). Thus, at least in the long
run, their expected utilities in a country are unaected unless this country directly experiences
a credit crunch. By contrast, for the country that experiences the credit crunch, the welfare
eect is generally ambiguous.
Lemma 4. Consider the steady-state equilibrium. Suppose that the entrepreneurs' welfare in
each country is dened as an entrepreneur's ex-ante utility. Then, a permanent credit crunch in
one country does not aect welfare in the other country, while it harms welfare in that country
if Z
dRj ()=dj
Rj ()
dGj() > 0;
that is, if the expectation of the rate of change in his/her income dRj=R

j is negative.
The sign of R 1j (dR

j=dj) depends on . For example, assume that  follows a Pareto
distribution:  !1 and Gj is specied as
Gj() = 1  (=) j ;
where j > 1. From such a specication of Gj , the cuto 
c
j(j;t) and average productivity of
the aggregate investment  j(j;t) are respectively given by
cj(j;t) = (1 + j;t)
1=j ;
 j(j;t) =
j
j   1(1 + j;t)
1=j > cj(j):
Since qj = 1=(j j(0))), the interest rate r

j is given by
1 + rj
 
= qj
c
j(0)

=
j   1
jj
: (21)
Then, dRj=dj = 0 if  < 
c(j), while
dRj
dj
= qj (  cj(j)) + (1 + j)
dqj
dj
= qj
j   1
j
(    j(j)) ;
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if   cj(j). We easily verify dRj=dj > 0 if  >  j(j), whereas dRj=dj < 0 if cj(j) <
   j(j).
By contrast, from Proposition 2, the workers in both countries always suer damage from
such a unilateral credit crunch as long as their indirect utility is increasing in their wage income.
5 Transitory Responses to a Temporal Credit Crunch
Thus far, we have examined how a permanent shock to nancial frictions aects the long-run
equilibrium from a qualitative perspective in order to make the characteristics of the model
easily understandable. At the same time, however, real-world nancial shocks such as credit
crunches are thought to be transitory phenomena. It is therefore important to check how
macroeconomic variables respond to a temporal shock. In this section, we numerically derive
their transitory responses by simply calibrating the parameter values in the model. Since the
present model is not prepared for a full-scale quantitative analysis (e.g., full depreciation of
capital and absence of trade costs), in some dimensions the model's predictions will depart
from reality. The purpose in this section is thus to explore the way in which a credit crunch in
one country internationally transmits through trade during the transitions.
5.1 Calibration
Suppose that in period 0, the economy has already arrived at the steady-state equilibrium,
where the degree of nancial frictions is given by
H;0 = F;0 = 0 > 0:
It is hereafter assumed that  follows a Pareto distribution as at the end of the previous
section, and the technology parameter  j(!) is specied as  j(!) = !
 j , where j  0, and
  F   H > 0. Under this specication,  is always given by the parameter .
Since the model is stripped down, the parameters are limited (see Table 1). As for j
and  their values are exogenously chosen as conventional values in standard macroeconomic
models. For the elasticity of substitution, we use the value in Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan
(2009) as the baseline ( = 1:5).12 Since trade in the intermediate goods plays a key role in
the international transmission, we also consider the case of when the intermediate goods are
relatively substitutable ( = 3:8). The population of workers is normalized to unity in both
countries.
12Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan in turn borrow this value from the benchmark in Backus et al. (1994).
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Table 1: Parameter values
j 0.91 Discount factor
 0.33 Cost share of capital
 1.5 Elasticity of substitution among varieties (baseline)
3.8 | (for comparison)
Lj 1 Population of workers
0 2.226 The initial value of 
j 12.36 Shape parameter of distribution
 0.836 Scale parameter (Minimum value of )
H 0 Comparative advantage
F 20.28 Comparative advantage
0, j , , and j are calibrated in the following way. First, we use the property that the
interest rate rj does not depend on j in the steady state as long as Gj is specied as a Pareto
distribution (see (21)). Given that, j is chosen so that r

j = 0:01 in both countries. From (21)
and H = F = 0:91, we obtain H = F ' 12:36 for all j. Next, let Dj  0Aj=(1 + 0)
denote the aggregate debt of the investing entrepreneurs. The ratio of that to the aggregate
capital is therefore given by
Dj
Kj
=
0
(1 + 0) (0)
;
where the subscript j of  j() and j is hereafter omitted because H = F . To obtain the
parameter values, it is assumed that
 (0) = 1, 
   1(1 + 0)
1= = 1: (22)
In other words, at the steady state, the nal good is transformed into capital on a one-to-one
basis on average as in standard macroeconomic models. The value of 0 is then chosen so that
Dj=K

j = 0=(1 + 0) = 0:69. We borrow this value from Buera and Nicolini (2017), who
choose this value to match the average ratio of liabilities to non-nancial assets for the U.S.
non-nancial business sector between 1997:Q3 and 2007:Q3. Then, by substituting the resulting
values of 0 and  into (22), the value of the scale parameter  is numerically obtained. Finally,
for the parameters of comparative advantage j , we rst assume  = 1:5 as the baseline. Given
that, (= F  H) is chosen so that the import share in the home country H is equal to about
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0.1 (i.e., Imports are about 10% of GDP in the home country).13 This is roughly consistent
with the actual imports-to-GDP ratio in the United States. The parameter H is normalized
to zero.
5.2 Transitory Responses
Consider the situation that at the end of period 1, a credit crunch unanticipatedly occurs in
the home country: H;1 < 0. It then deterministically recovers over time according to
log H;t+1 =  log H;t + (1  ) log 0; (23)
where  2 (0; 1) captures the degree of persistence of this shock. Since aiH;1 is given by HmiH;1,
individual net worth is predetermined before this credit shock occurs. Accordingly, its aggregate
value AH;1(= ZH;1) is predetermined. Furthermore, from the equilibrium system (14){(17), all
the market variables in period 1 depend only on Aj;0 and j;0. Thus, in period 1, only the
cuto cH;1 responds to the shock in H;1, and this makes KH;2(=  (H;1)AH;1) deviate from
its steady-state level. The world economy then follows the dynamic system now described by
(14){(17) and (23) together with F;t = 0 for all t. Throughout the paper, the parameter 
is chosen as 0:90. Given this value, H;1 is assumed to be 1.22, about a 45% decrease from 0.
This value is chosen so that GDP in the home country decreases by about 1% from peak to
trough.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the responses of the major variables in the home and foreign
countries, respectively. In each panel, the vertical axis is the percentage deviation of the variable
from its initial steady state, except for the interest rate (percentage points). The responses are
simulated by using the log-linear approximation of the equilibrium system around the initial
steady state. Appendix F provides the derivation of the approximated system.
13j;t is primarily dened as the ratio of imports to the value-added of the nal good in country j (see footnote
9). However, the following relationship holds:
Yj;t =
Z 1
0
pt(!)xj;t(!)d!
=
Z

j;t
pt(!)xj;t(!)d! +
Z

n;t
pt(!)xj;t(!)d!
=
Z

j;t
pt(!)Xj;t(!)d!| {z }
GDP
+
Z

n;t
pt(!)xj;t(!)d!  
Z

j;t
pt(!)xn;t(!)d!| {z }
=0 *trade balance
= GDPj;t:
In this model, j;t also represents the ratio of imports-to-GDP in country j.
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Figure 2: Responses in the home country (domestic responses)
From these gures, we can nd several properties of the model. First, the international
synchronization observed in the steady-state equilibrium is now also observed during transi-
tion periods. From the panels showing the responses of wages, investment, capital, GDP, and
entrepreneurs' aggregate income in these gures, we can see that even without international
nancial transactions, a country-specic credit shock in one country triggers a synchronized
international downturn. Recall that workers' aggregate consumption CWj;t is wj;tLj and en-
trepreneurs' aggregate consumption CEj;t is given by jZj;t=(1   j). Therefore, the fourth
and fth panels in these gures also represent the responses of workers' and entrepreneurs'
consumption, respectively.
Second, such an international co-movement is closely related to the change in the equilib-
rium trade patterns of the intermediate goods. Further, this property has already been veried
analytically in the steady-state equilibrium. To see how this property holds during the tran-
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Figure 3: Responses in the foreign country (international transmissions)
sitions, the following equations are helpful, the derivations of which are given in Appendix
F:
bAF;t+1 = bwF;t+1 =  bAF;t + Fb!ct+1;bqF;t+1 =  (1  ) bAF;t + Fb!ct+1:
In these equations, a hat over a variable represents the rate of deviation from the initial steady
state (e.g., bAF;t = (AF;t AF )=AF ). The responses of the major variables in the foreign country
are derived by using these equations. On the right-hand side of each equation,  b!ct+1 > 0
represents the rate of the increase in the extensive margin of exports in the foreign country.
Thus, from the standpoint of the foreign country, a credit shock that occurs in the partner
country behaves as if it is a trade shock, meaning that the intermediate good rms in the home
country suddenly lose their international competitiveness.
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Third, as shown in Figure 3, the degree of international co-movement increases as the
intermediate goods become more complementary. As shown in the above equations, the co-
movement arises since the variables in the foreign country negatively respond to its increase
in the extensive margin of exports. Indeed, as shown in the third and fourth panels in Figure
3, the factor prices in the foreign country fall after the shock. The second panel of Figure 3
shows that the change in !c increases if the intermediate goods become more complementary.
Thus, if the intermediate goods become more complementary, such a decline in the factor prices
becomes more serious and then the movement of the macroeconomic variables in both countries
becomes more internationally synchronized. In the baseline case of  = 1:5, GDP in the foreign
country decreases by roughly 0.6% from peak to trough. This is 60% of the decrease in the
home country.
6 Concluding Remarks
This study proposes a simple two-country dynamic general equilibrium framework for studying
how nancial shocks in one country propagate to the other country through international trade.
Many studies that have analyzed the international transmission of nancial shocks assume a
one-good economy and focus on the transmission mechanisms in various types of nancial
integration (e.g., integration in bond markets, in equity markets, and in both). By contrast,
this study focuses on nancial frictions as a determinant of the comparative advantage. It shows
that a credit crunch in one country misallocates domestic nancial resources to less productive
entrepreneurs. On the one hand, this changes the equilibrium trade patterns. On the other
hand, this triggers a synchronized international downturn even without international nancial
transactions. In the case of a permanent credit crunch, these results are analytically obtained
without relying on the specication of the distribution function or assuming symmetry across
the two countries. In this sense, this study is the rst to develop a tractable dynamic general
equilibrium model simultaneously incorporating nancial frictions, endogenous trade patterns,
and asymmetric countries.
To obtain the qualitative results, this study developed a highly stylized model. Therefore,
the following two points should be kept in mind. First, we abstract from any trade barriers such
as iceberg trade costs and/or import taris. Second, we do not incorporate the international
integration of equity markets, which plays an important role in the international transmission
in existing studies. Thus, introducing these elements into the framework presented in this
paper appears to be a promising extension.
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Appendix A Derivation of the Policy Function
We can solve problem (3) by using the method of guess and verify. Guess that the value
function takes the form Vj;t(m; ) = vj;t() + b logm, where vj;t() and b are unknown. Since
EtVj;t+1(m
0; 0) = Etvj;t+1(0)+b logm0, (6) implies a = jbm=(1+jb). Moreover, asm(a; ) =
Rj;t+1()a, the Bellman equation (3) therefore becomes
vj;t()+ b logm = log

1
1 + jb
m

+j

Etvj;t+1(
0) + b log

Rj;t+1()

jb
1 + jb
m

; (24)
which gives b = 1=(1  j). Then, a is given by a = jm, or equivalently aij;t = jmij;t.
Appendix B Derivations of (14){(17)
Since the derivations of (14) and (15) are straightforward, here we derive (16) and (17).
By applying Shepherd's lemma to the cost function, mcj;t(!)Xj;t(!), we have Kj;t(!) =
pt(!)Xj;t(!)=qj;t and Lj;t(!) = (1   )pt(!)Xj;t(!)=wj;t for all ! 2 
j;t. By substituting
these equations respectively into (8) and (9) and using (1), (10), and xj;t(!) = pt(!)
 Yj;t, we
obtain
qj;tKj;t = 

qj;tw
1 
j;t
1 
(YH;t + YF;t)
Z
!2
j;t
 j(!)
1 d!; (25)
wj;tLj = (1  )

qj;tw
1 
j;t
1 
(YH;t + YF;t)
Z
!2
j;t
 j(!)
1 d!: (26)
Replace the subscript t with t + 1. By dividing (26) for j = H by that for j = F , we obtain
(16). Furthermore, by using (26), (25) is expressed as
qj;t+1Kj;t+1 =

1  wj;t+1Lj :
By substituting Kj;t+1 =  (j;t)Aj;t into this equation and following the same procedure, we
obtain (17).
Appendix C Proof of Lemma 2
Let bxt  log xt   log x ' (xt   x)=x. From (14){(17), a log-linear approximated system
around ( eA; !c; ew; eq) is given by
bAt+1 = bqt+1 + bAt + HbH;t   F bF;t; (27)
 b!ct+1 = bqt+1 + (1  ) bwt+1; (28)bwt+1 = (1  ) [bqt+1 + (1  ) bwt+1] + "b!ct+1; (29)bAt = bwt+1   bqt+1   HbH;t   F bF;t ; (30)
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where a tilde over the symbols is omitted. j , 
, and " are respectively dened as
j 
j 
0
j(j)
 j(j)
;
  !
c 0H(!
c)
 H(!c)
  !
c 0F (!
c)
 F (!c)
> 0;
"  "H + "F > 0; "j 
!c j(!c)1 R

j
 j(!)
1 d!
> 0:
The sign of  comes from that  F (!)= H(!) is decreasing with respect to !, and the sign of
" comes from Assumption 1. From (28) and (29), we obtain
b!ct+1 =    bqt+1; (31)
bwt+1 =  [(   1) + "]

bqt+1; (32)
where
  [1 + (   1)(1  )] + (1  )" > 0:
By substituting (32) into (30), we obtain bqt+1 =    bAt + HbH;t   F bF;t, where
 

1 +
[(   1) + "]

 1
2 (0; 1):
Then, the dynamic equation of eAt is given by bAt+1 = (1   )( bAt + HbH;t   F bF;t). Since
(1   ) 2 (0; 1), this equation shows that given any eA0 > 0, eAt converges to eA as long asbj;t = 0 holds in the long run. That is, the steady state eA is locally stable.
Appendix D Proof of Proposition 2
First, by logarithmically dierentiating (18), we obtain dqF =q

F + (1  )dwF =wF + = 0,
where  is
 =
 
qF w
1 
F
1 
1  
8><>:
h eq ew1 1   H(!c)1     F (!c)1 i d!c
+(1  )  eq ew(1 )1  R !c0  H(!)1 d! deqeq + (1  )d ewew

9>=>; :
On the right-hand side of this equation, the rst term in the brackets becomes zero because of
(15). Moreover, by using the same equation, we can rewrite deq=eq + (1   )d ew= ew in the
second term as  d!c=!c. Then, we can obtain  =  Fd!c=!c, where j 2 (0; 1) is
dened in the main body of the text. We obtain dwF =w

F as
dwF
wF
=   1
1  


dqF
qF
  F
d!c
!c

: (33)
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From (19), (20), and (33),
dwH
wH
 d ewew + dwFwF
=   1
1  


dqH
qH
+ H
d!c
!c

: (34)
By using (19) and the fact that dqj =q

j = jdj=j , we can more simply express (33) and (34)
as
dwj
wj
=   
1  

1  

j



j
dj
j
+
j


n
dn
n

; j; n(6= j) 2 fH;Fg: (35)
On the right-hand side, the rst term in the brackets is the direct eect of a credit crunch
and the second term is the indirect eect induced by international trade. The denition of
 in Appendix C shows that  > . From this fact and j 2 (0; 1), we can verify that
1  j= > 0 for all j. Then, (35) shows that the wage rates in both countries decline.
Appendix E Derivation of EV SSj (jjm)
From Appendix A, we obtain Vj;t(m; ) = vj;t() + (1  j) 1 logm. From (24), vj;t() satises
vj;t() = j
Z 

vj;t+1(
0)dGj(0) +
j
1  j log [Rj;t+1()] +
j
1  j log j + log(1  j):
In general, the functional form of vj;t() will vary, as it is aected by changes in the market
variables, say, qj;t+1 and rj;t+1. In the steady-state equilibrium, however, these variables are
given by their steady state. This implies that the functional from of vj becomes stationary.
vj;t() = vj;t+1() = v

j () for all . By using this, we obtain V

j (m; ) = v

j ()+(1 j) 1 logm,
andZ
vj ()dGj() =
1
1  j
(
j
1  j
Z 

log

Rj ()

dGj() +
j
1  j log j + log(1  j)
)
:
Then, we can obtain EV SSj (j jm) in the main body of the text.
Appendix F Brief Derivations of the Transitory Responses
A log-linear approximation of the system for ( eAt+1; !ct+1; ewt+1; eqt+1) around the steady state is
given by (27){(30) in Appendix C, where bj;t is now specied as
bH;t+1 = bH;t; bF;t = 0: (36)
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By solving these equations, we can obtain
bAt+1 = (1  ) bAt + HbH;t ; (37)
b!ct+1 =   bAt + HbH;t ; (38)
bwt+1 = [(   1) + "]

 bAt + HbH;t ; (39)
bqt+1 =    bAt + HbH;t ; (40)
where a tilde over the symbols is omitted. Given the initial conditions bA1 = 0 and b1 '
(H;1   0)=0 < 0, (36) and (37) provide the response of eAt. Once this is obtained, the
responses of (!ct+1; eqt+1; ewt+1) are given by (38){(40).
The responses of the other major variables in each country are accordingly determined.
The system for (AF;t+1; qF;t+1; wF;t+1) is given by
AF;t+1 = F qF;t+1 F (F;t)AF;t;
 F (F;t)AF;t =

1  
wF;t+1
qF;t+1
LF ;
1 = qF;t+1w
1 
F;t+1
" eqt+1 ew1 t+1 1  Z !ct+1
0
 H(!)
1 d! +
Z 1
!ct+1
 F (!)
1 d!
#1=(1 )
:
The rst equation is the dynamic equation of AF;t. The second equation corresponds to the
market-clearing condition for capital in the foreign country. The third equation is the nal
good rms' zero-prot condition, which is the condition that the nal good price equals the
price index of the intermediate goods. Noting that F;t does not change from 0 (i.e., bF;t = 0),
a log-linear approximation of the above system is
bAF;t+1 = bqF;t+1 + bAF;t;bAF;t = bwF;t+1   bqF;t+1;
0 = bqF;t+1 + (1  ) bwF;t+1   Fb!ct+1:
From these equations, we readily obtain
bAF;t+1 = bwF;t+1 =  bAF;t + Fb!ct+1; (41)bqF;t+1 =  (1  ) bAF;t + Fb!ct+1: (42)
Then, we obtain
bAH;t+1 = bAt+1 + bAF;t+1; (43)bqH;t+1 = bqt+1 + bqF;t+1; (44)bwH;t+1 = bwt+1 + bwF;t+1: (45)
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Since the investment Zj;t is given by Aj;t, capital Kj;t+1 is given by  j(j;t)Aj;t, workers'
and entrepreneurs' aggregate consumption, CWj;t and C
E
j;t, are respectively given by wj;tL and
jAj;t=(1  j), and GDP is given by qj;tKj;t +wj;tLj , the responses of all the major variables
in this model are obtained by using (36){(45).
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Separate Appendix (not for publication): Model with the Partial
Depreciation of Capital
In this section, it is assumed that capital depreciates only partially, while the remaining capital
is liquidated before the new investment. In this case, the investment technology equation
remains the same, whereas the budget constraint is replaced by
(qj;t + 1  j)kij;t   (1 + rj;t)dij;t 1 + dij;t = cij;t + zij;t;
where j 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate. Then, the second-stage optimization problem (4) is
replaced by
mj;t+1(a; ) = max
z
n
(qj;t+1 + 1  j)z   (1 + rj;t+1)(z   a) j 0  z  (1 + j;t)a
o
:
The cuto of investment technology cj;t is now given by
cj;t =
1 + rj;t+1
qj;t+1 + 1  j ;
and (7) is replaced by Aj;t+1 = j [(qj;t+1 + 1  j)Kj;t+1 + (1 + rj;t+1)Bj;t]. Since the market-
clearing condition for the one-period bonds does not change, Bj;t = 0. Then, the dynamic
equation of relative wealth (14) becomes
eAt+1 = H
F
 F (H;t)
 F (F;t)
eqt+1qF;t+1 + 1  H
qF;t+1 + 1  F
eAt: (46)
Thus, the system of equations (15){(17) and (46) no longer constitute the autonomous dynamic
system, since it lacks the equation to obtain qF;t+1. The autonomous system in this case is
given by (15){(17), (46), and the following subsystem:
AF;t+1 = F (qF;t+1 + 1  F ) F (F;t)AF;t; (47)
 F (F;t)AF;t =

1  
wF;t+1
qF;t+1
LF ; (48)
1 = qF;t+1w
1 
F;t+1
" eqt+1 ew1 t+1 1  Z !ct+1
0
 H(!)
1 d! +
Z 1
!ct+1
 F (!)
1 d!
#1=(1 )
:
(49)
These constitute the system for (AF;t+1; qF;t+1; wF;t+1). The rst equation is the dynamic
equation of AF;t. The second equation corresponds to the market-clearing condition for capital
in the foreign country. The third equation is the nal good rms' zero-prot condition, which
is the condition that the nal good price equals the price index of the intermediate goods.
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We can easily show the unique existence of the steady-state equilibrium. To this end, assume
that j;t becomes a constant. From (47) with AF;t = AF;t+1, we obtain q

F = 1=(F F (F )) 
(1  F ). By substituting this into (46) and imposing eAt+1 = eAt, eq is now given by
eq = 1
qF

F F (F )
H H(H)
(qF + 1  F )  (1  H)

=
1=(H H(H))  (1  H)
1=(F F (F ))  (1  F )

 q

H
qF

:
We assume that  j(j) is suciently small that eq is positive. Then, substituting q into (15){
(17) yields (!c; ew; eA). Once these are found, (wF ; AF ) are accordingly determined from (48)
and (49).
We can obtain the same results for the comparative statics in the main body. In other words,
we can show Propositions 1{3. To see why, rst note that (19) and (20) are also satised in this
case. Moreover, as the above equation shows, eq is increasing in H , whereas it is decreasing in
F . Then, we can obtain the same result as Proposition 1. Next, note that (33) and (34) in
Appendix D, which gives the proof of Proposition 2, also hold in this case, since these equations
come from (18){(20), which are satised irrespective of the existence of partial depreciation.
This implies that Proposition 2 holds in this case. Finally, from its proof, we can nd that
Proposition 3 is established if Proposition 2 holds true. Then, we can obtain the same results
as in the main body of the text.
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